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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we apply some of the insights of Bruno Latour and 
actor network theory to suggest that games and virtual spaces can 
be  interpreted  as  aesthetic  forms  which  are  established  and 
stabilised  by  a  ‘collective’  of  humans  and  technologies.  The 
‘agents’ that comprise any collective or network – whether it be a 
simple human-tool relation or a far more complex assemblage of 
actors in massively multiplayer games – are equally human and 
non human, social and material, corporeal and technical. Yet the 
combining  effects  of  these  factors  rarely  rate  a  mention  in  the 
discourses of ludology and game studies, which we suggest is for 
several  key  historical  and  technical reasons. The application of 
actor-network theory to games and virtual environments aims to 
facilitate a nuanced understanding that exceeds more conventional 
user- and viewer-centred interpretations in game studies, and is 
therefore more organic to the open-ended and constantly changing 
nature  of  our  engagement  with  online  games  and  virtual 
environments.  
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
According  to  my  origin  myth,  it  is  impossible  even  to 
conceive of an artifact that does not incorporate social 
relations,  or  to  define  a  social  structure  without  the 
integration  of  nonhumans  into  it.  Every  human 
interaction is sociotechnical.   
Bruno Latour (1994: 805-6). 
 
In this paper we begin with the assumption that digital games are 
aesthetic forms created and sustained by the collective agencies 
and proclivities of both humans and technologies. We examine 
the  conditions  that  allow  or  deny  these  relationships  to 
materialize,  and  suggest  that  they  are  simultaneously  material, 
corporeal, social and technical. Yet the combining effect of these 
factors  rarely  rate a mention in the discourses of ludology and 
game studies, which we suggest is for several key historical and 
technical  reasons.  Using  the  work  of  Bruno  Latour  (and  the 
insights  of  Actor  Network  theory  more  generally),  we examine 
game-play outside the more common user-centred interpretations 
in ludology texts. In particular, we consider some of the material, 
corporeal  and  technical  affordances  relevant  to  digital  gaming, 
and suggest how Massively Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs) 
or  Massively  Multiplayer  Online  Role  Playing  Games 
(MMORPGs)  can  be  considered  as  sociotechnical  in  Latour’s 
terms – as multi-perspectival, generative, dynamic, embodied and 
open-ended networks of human and non-human agency.   
 
Playing computer games is seriously challenging. The act of play 
is full of possibilities that are as much about overcoming obstacles 
as they are about contributing to something larger that the sum of 
its parts. Often governed by a small number of rules, computer 
games can geminate relationships of surprising complexity, often 
building patterns  and perpetual novelty  far  beyond the maker’s 
intentions.  These  relationships  multiply  exponentially  when 
environments such as massive multiplayer online games are taken 
into account. To say that online multiplayer computer games are 
simply fun belies the importance of being subjected to the ebb and 
flow  of  an  emergent  dynamic  involving  social,  material  and 
technological  components.  This  evolving  relationship  made  of 
multiple intentions, intelligences and goals often takes on a life of 
its own, constantly challenging assumptions about the nature of 
how games are played and who is playing who.  
 
MMOGs and MMORPGs have been enabled by the internet, with 
varying levels of pictorial and strategic complexity. Initially only 
accessible  by  military  and  research  organizations  the  internet 
became a public domain with game possibilities that allowed for 
the  creation  of  virtual  spaces that where not confined within a 
single  user’s  machine.  MMORPGs  can  evolve  into  persistent 
worlds with tens of thousands of players, and simulate expansive 
virtual  environments  that  continue  to  exist  and  change  with  or 
without  any  one  user’s  input.    MMORPGs  such  as  Everquest, 
World of Warcraft and Eve Online allow users from around the 
world  to  interact  and  game  together,  creating  their  own 
adventures,  friendships  and  societies  over  the  Internet.  Online 
 
. 
 multiplayer games are unique to the virtual space of media forms; 
although other media such as TV and cinema offer the possibility 
of a mass audience consumption simultaneously, the virtual space 
that is created online can be explored, travelled and engaged with 
from  multiple  perspectives,  with  each  user  participating  in  and 
impacting upon the virtual space in real time. As we will argue, 
the  ‘actor-network’  model can effectively describe the  complex 
interaction and agency emerging from multiplayer online games. 
Before this, however, it is useful to consider why ludology has 
tended  towards  visualist,  subjectivist,  user-centred  and 
immaterialist interpretations of games. 
 
2.  VISUALISM AND BLACKBOXING 
 
Why  is  it  that  the  very  material  processes  of  human/computer 
interaction,  transistors,  CPU’s  or  memory,  that  make  the 
collective space of computer games possible in the first place are 
never seen as important? There are several reasons, but perhaps 
the two main culprits are the strong visualism or ocularcentrism in 
Western  culture  (with  the  screen  interface  –  the  ‘face’  of 
tehcnoloyg - is the primary technology of vision), and the aptly 
named process of blackboxing.  
 
Contemporary  western  culture  can  be  said  to  have  a particular 
epistemological  and  perceptual  bias,  an  ocularcentrism  which 
works  to  prioritise  visual  and  screen  representations.  Theorists 
such  as  Martin  Jay  (1993),  Jonathon  Crary  (1992,  1999),  and 
David Levin (1988, 1993) have suggested that this properly began 
with  the  tradition  of  linear  perspective,  a  visually  configured 
space that has become so transparent to Western sensibility that it 
seems  the  effect  of  a  ‘natural’  vision,  if  not  a  quality  of  the 
objective  world.  Yet  as  the  theorists  listed  above  argue,  linear 
perspectivalism  is  the  result  of  a  particular  instrumental 
development in Renaissance art, a technique which enabled the 
translation of three-dimensional space onto a two dimensional flat 
canvas  (Jay,  1993:  51;  Harper,  2000).  In  Alberti’s  model  of 
perspective  (see  figure  1),  the  artist  uses  a  grid  —  sometimes 
referred  to  as  “the  square  grid  of  the Renaissance” (Naughton, 
2003)
 — to illustrate a two-dimensional representation in terms of 
a pyramid, with its apex the vanishing point, so as to give the 
illusion of three dimensional depth. 
  
This grid was ideally used by a single privileged spectator (the 
artist), who could step back from the scene and observe from an 
elevated  position.  In  his  analysis  of  Alberti’s  window  or  veil, 
Robert  Romanyshyn  (1989)  points  to  the  broader  artifactual 
effects  of  the  apparatus  (Harper,  2000),  and  suggests  how  it 
demarcated  what  could  be  counted  as  the  visible.  The  gridded 
device  operates  as  a  boundary,  a  frame  which  defines  the 
seen/scene  as  separate  from  the  observer.  From  the  viewer’s 
perspective,  the  field  of  vision  is  fixed,  and  begins  at  a  point 
beyond  the  imaginary surface of the window;  the viewer looks 
into  the  scene,  but  is  not  themself  in  it.  This  model  of  linear 
perspective underlined and popularised the Cartesian dialectic of 
subject and object, such that in the space of linear perspective the 
observer sees the world as if through a window. Significantly, the 
viewer’s bodily movement is restricted by the device, in that the 
grid needs to remain directly between the scene and the line of 
sight: the body is at the service of vision, an eye-body. 
 
Figure 1: Alberti's Grid - c.1450 (Naughton, 2003) 
 
As Romanyshyn argues: “Alberti’s window, which begins as an 
artistic  device,  thus  becomes  a  style  of  thought,  a  cultural 
perception,  a  way  of  imagining  the  world…  The  window  as 
membrane becomes the boundary, the place where the world is 
divided into exterior and interior domains” (Romanyshyn 1989: 
69).  
 
This aesthetic of window-on-the-world can thus be traced from 
perspectival painting to the numerous media screens (cinematic, 
televisual, computer) in contemporary use. Critics such as Weibel 
go so far as to say that:  
The primacy of the eye… as the dominant sense organ of 
the  twentieth  century  is  a  partial  effect  of  a  technical 
revolution that put an enormous apparatus to the service of 
vision. The rise of the eye is rooted in the fact that all of its 
aspects  (creation,  transmission,  reception)  were  supported 
by analog and digital machines. The triumph of the visual in 
the  twentieth  century  is  the  triumph  of  techno-vision 
(Weibel 1996: 339). 
And  as  Manovich  points  out,  despite  numerous  innovations  in 
televisual media, the window remains as the archetypal interface:  
Dynamic,  real-time,  interactive,  a  screen  is  still  a  screen. 
Interactivity, simulation, and telepresence: as was the case 
centuries  ago,  we  are  still  looking  at  a  flat,  rectangular 
surface, existing in the  space  of  our  body  and acting as a 
window into another space. We still have not left the era of 
the screen (Manovich 2001: 115). 
In  contemporary  life  screens  are  often  a  primary  focus  of  our 
attention and concern: they literally frame and display that which is relevant or worthy of notice. Yet while it is possible to trace our 
bias towards windowed perception and the priority we give to that 
which can be seen, it could be argued that some screens depart 
from  the  visual  tradition  of  ‘objectivity’  guaranteed  by  the 
distance between object (the seen) and subject (the viewer). It is 
thus  important  to  trace the  specific effects of screens today, in 
terms of their functionality as cinematic screens, computer screens 
and  televisions,  along  with  their  many  modes  of  content 
specificity  –  as  games,  video,  DVD  interface  and  so  on.  As 
theorists such as John Ellis and Chris Chesher point out, ways of 
seeing and ‘conventions of looking’ are not innate or given, but 
culturally, materially and corporeally contextual, such that each 
‘new visual technology emerges with its own conventions — its 
own  structures  of  feeling’  and  concomitant  mechanisms  of 
attraction and counter-distraction (Chesher, 2004). In his analysis 
of the console game, for example, Chesher (2004) distinguishes 
between  ways  of  looking  specific  to  cinema,  television  and 
console games — characterised by the gaze, the glance and the 
glaze respectively. As Chesher suggests, while cinema demands 
constant focus, and television requires only intermittent attention, 
console games are ‘sticky’, holding the player to the screen via 
both  a  quasi-visceral  immersion  in  depth-perspective  virtual 
space,  and  a  haptic  attachment  to  the  hand-controller  and 
peripherals: ‘In glazespace… players suspend their awareness of 
their day-to-day world to become cybernetically suspended within 
a  virtualised  sensorimotor  space  of  the  game  world’  (Chesher, 
2004). Thus while other forms of windowed perception have been 
primarily  visual,  the  game  experience  sets  up  a  different 
relationship with the screen, and a different experience of screen 
space as something with virtual depth to be entered, explored and 
traversed. As Newman states: ‘the pleasures of videogame play 
are  not  principally  visual  but  rather  kinaesthetic’  (Newman, 
2002).  
 
There are many instances of the agency of embodied interactions 
with screens that go beyond the visualist paradigm, to do with the 
physicality of the body and its own motility, and the relationship 
between the navigation of virtual space and the body. When using 
a hand controller, for example, we incorporate both it and the on-
screen space into our own bodily space, and utilise it as a device 
that  extends  our  reach  and  the  realm  of  agentic  possibility  in 
televisual  space.  As  Pam  Martin  comments,  without  having  to 
consciously attend to button-pressing, we are able to aim at the 
screen by manipulating these instruments somewhat like a second 
body (Martin, 2002). In a more general sense, as bodies we clearly 
have a frontal and gravitational ontology that impacts upon the 
way in which we navigate screens. For example, the standard GUI 
on the PC screen, such as Windows Explorer, is configured in 
such a way that we experience our progression through directories 
as forward and back, in and out, up and down, in way that is more 
or less familiar to us in the actual world, thus ‘user-friendly’. This 
body-interface relation also impacts upon the way we experience 
space in virtual environments, as something to be explored and 
colonised  or  conquered.  As  James  Newman  suggests,  in  many 
games  the  space  itself  is  often  an  adversary.  This  clearly 
differentiates the virtual space of computer games as something 
quite  distinct  from  the  spatiality  of  traditional  screen  media 
interfaces,  which  are  extractive  or  ‘lean  back’  rather  than 
immersive or ‘lean forward’.  
 
While  there  is  no  doubt  that  we  have  a  primarily  ‘frontal’ 
relationship with the TV screen, however, this is not to say that 
we have no association with the ‘backs’ of such devices, although 
these interactions are for the most part brief and functional, that 
is,  for  the  purpose  of  connection,  or  negotiating  an  effective 
relationship with  the front. When a  machine runs smoothly for 
extended periods of time, however, its working processes often 
become  blackboxed.  People  often  legitimize  blackboxing  by 
stating that they don’t need to know how a computer or a machine 
works in order to use it successfully. In some manifestations, such 
as automatic backup or scheduled tasks regularly performed on a 
computer hard drive, this ‘black-boxing’ seems appropriate. Yet 
blackboxing  represents  some  major  disadvantages  to  those 
interested in understanding complex sociotechnical relationships. 
To begin with it encourages observers to concentrate on the “real” 
work of defining fixed inputs and outputs – which is most often 
rendered  as visual images or visual translations of information. 
This is fine if you intend to measure quantifiable outcomes but not 
so  effective  if  you  want  to  uncover  how  these  outcomes  came 
about.  By  examining  and  understanding  the  process  of 
blackboxing  it  is  easy  to  see  how  we  get  fixed  a-priori 
interpretations of the human-machine relation.  
 
Practices such as black-boxing encourage us to ‘naturally’ assume 
the  humanist  stance  that  complex  machines  like  computers  are 
mere tools, separate from and without influence when it comes to 
human activity. The need to clearly demarcate the competencies 
of both humans and  machines stems in part from our anxieties 
about what it means to be a human being. The very same notion 
that drives these distinctions also reifies the concepts that human 
thought and action are primarily influenced by social interactions. 
There is no doubt that social forces are powerful, but no amount 
of constructionist theory can do justice to the material impact of 
human/computer  interaction,  CPU’s  or  transistors  in  computer 
games. Similar relativistic story telling is exemplified in much of 
ludology  discourse  in  that  the  semiotic  (textual) and the social 
become  interpreted  as  the  prime  movers  for  most  MMOG  and 
MMORPG environments. As such, human intellect and intention 
(the  engineers  for  all  things  social  and  thereby  privileged  by 
cultural determinism) is left relatively autonomous from the vast 
array of interactions it has with technology and machines.  
 
In what follows we will appraise the perspectives and concepts of 
several  theorists  that  allow  us  to  think  about  the  relational 
ontology or imbrication of the social, the corporeal, the material 
and the technical in collective rather than discrete or autonomous 
terms, and outside the visualist and human-centred interpretations 
of agency and interface. We are not suggesting that technology 
(instead  of  society)  is  the  primary  influence  on  humans  when 
engaging with contemporary media screens and playing computer 
games. Rather, we are arguing that a broader set of relationships 
must be taken into account when we consider an assemblage of 
computers,  computer  games,  players,  bodies,  devices  and  all 
manner of other agents. 
 3.  ACTORS, AGENTS, NETWORKS 
 
Actor-network  theory  considers  humans  and  artefacts  as 
negotiations of both the social and the technical, irreducibly and 
non-hierarchically  agents  or  actors  within  sociotechnical 
networks.  Bruno  Latour  conceptualizes  the  human-technology 
relation as a heterogeneous network of human and non humans 
(technologies/machines/materials)  that  work  together  to  make 
things possible that neither could achieve without the other. Just 
think how much of so called human advancement would not have 
been  possible  were  it  not  for  ‘non  humans’  such  as  books, 
combustion engines or laboratory apparatuses. Likewise, consider 
the  amount  of  work,  in  all  its  ethical,  political,  technical  or 
material  forms  that  is delegated to the simplest of  non-humans 
(machines). The point is that technical objects define a general 
framework of actions together with the actors and spaces in which 
they  are  supposed  to  act  (Akrich,  1992).  In  this  way  Latour’s 
project is to consider the infinite networks of technological, social 
and material mediations that actively contribute to the evolution 
of the collective.  
 
Mediated  relationships  that  we  have  with  non  humans  are  all 
around us, and influence almost everything we do; none more so 
than  when  interacting  with  tools.  Latour  explains  the  complex 
nature of mediation in relation to how humans and guns interact 
and how through their interactions they become a collective: 
If I define you by what you have (the gun), and by the series 
of associations that you enter into when you use what you 
have (when you fire the gun), then you are modified by the 
gun - more or less so, depending on the weight of the other 
associations  that  you  carry…You  are  another  subject 
because you hold the gun; the gun is another object because 
it  has  entered  into  a  relationship  with  you  (Latour  1999: 
179). 
In  another  words  a  certain  level  of  influence  is  distributed 
throughout  the  relationship,  irretrievably  altering  each  of  their 
associated goals and objectives. The gun for example is designed 
and  inscribed  with  multifarious  untold  historical,  political  and 
ergonomic  goals  that  aid  in  its  main  mechanical  purpose  of 
moving  projectiles.  Similarly  the  human’s  goals  are  bound  up 
with all manner of social and psychological narratives that aid in 
the personal belief that a gun is required for protection. This can 
be represented in diagrammatic form in figure 2 (see appendix).   
 
When the two agents join, any number of unintended goals can 
emerge which are made possible only by their association in the 
collective. So much so, that when you originally wanted the gun, 
you only wanted to protect yourself, but now with the gun in your 
hand, you want to kill (Latour 1999: 179).   
 
The key point is that the prime mover of an action becomes a new, 
distributed, and nested series of practices that is only made visible 
if we respect the mediating role of all manner of heterogeneous 
agents. This leads Latour to redefine action as: 
 
not  a  property  of  humans,  but  of  an  association  of  actants 
[human  or  nonhuman  agents]…Provisional  ‘actorial’  roles 
may be attributed to actants only because actants are in the 
process  of  exchanging  competencies,  offering  one  another 
new  possibilities,  new  goals,  new  functions  (Latour  1999: 
182)  
Questions  about  the  nature  of  action  force  us  to  ask  questions 
about who constructs what and where the impetus for that action 
comes from. If actions are recast as a collective force then the 
implications of such associations are rooted far deeper than mere 
physical  action.  Just  as  all  designed  objects  are  prescribed  in 
advance  with  the  users’  perceptions  in  mind;  so  must  our 
associations with non humans alter our thoughts and beliefs. As 
Latour surmises: 
I do not deny that people have minds - but the mind is not a 
world creating despot that makes up  facts to suit its fancy. 
Thought  is  seized,  modified,  altered,  possessed  by  non 
humans,  who  in  their  turn,  given  this  opportunity  by  the 
scientists work; alter their trajectories, destinies and histories. 
(Latour 1999: 282) 
Whenever  we  make  something  we  are  often  overtaken  and 
surprised by the twists and turns of that construction coming into 
being. Even for a situation seemingly as simple as acquiring and 
holding  a  gun,  the  relations  and  possible  implications  become 
much more complex when the collective is taken into account. 
This is somewhat similar to what Don Ihde (1991) refers to as the 
unintentional  effects,  latent  inclinations  or  trajectories  of 
technologies, tools and interfaces, and in the game context could 
be  recognised  as  the  ‘non-trivial’  or  unpredictable  effects  or 
results  of  gameplay  (Kucklich.  2003).  To  this  point,  then,  via 
Latour’s non-humanist notion of ‘actors’, we have made a case for 
the recognition of a broader set of relationships that mediate our 
associations with technological devices and apparatuses. What is 
at  stake  are  clear  definitions  of  mastery,  subjectivity  and 
objectivity  and  how  these  definitions  are  changed  by  mediated 
environments.  
 
So let’s consider briefly just one of the agentic components in this 
actor-network: the corporeal schematic of the human body and its 
variable  ontology  within  sociotechnical  spaces  such  as 
virtual/game  environments.  As  Zoë  Sofoulis  notes,  in  actor-
network terms, ‘what a body is becomes more a matter of what it 
is  connected  to,  which  kinds  of  nonhumans  it  shares its world 
with,  and  what  properties  it  has  swapped  with  those  entities’ 
(Sofoulis 2002: 275).The interpretation of ‘embodiment’ as itself 
agentic  and  changeable  according  to  its  ‘environment’  or 
situation, is also proposed by theorists such as Donna Haraway in 
her concept of the ‘material-semiotic actor’, and perhaps can be 
traced  much  earlier  to  phenomenologists  such  as  Hans  Jonas 
(1966)  and  Maurice  Merleau-Ponty  (1964).  As  Merleau-Ponty 
famously claimed, the body ‘applies itself to space like a hand to 
an instrument’ (1964: 5), an ‘application’ that depends as much 
on the specificities of perception and bodily movement as it does 
on  the  materiality  of  the  tool-in-use.  In  his  well-known 
description  of  the  blind  man  and  his  stick,  Merleau-Ponty 
describes  how  the  corporeal  schema  of  the  body  ‘dilates’  and 
‘retracts’ to accommodate tools:   The blind man’s stick has ceased to be an object for him and 
is no longer perceived  for itself; its point has become an 
area of sensitivity, extending the scope and active radius of 
touch and providing a parallel to sight. In the exploration of 
things, the length of the stick does not enter expressively as 
a  middle  term:  the  blind  man  is  aware  of  it  through  the 
position  of  objects  rather  than  of  the  position  of  objects 
through  it.  The  position  of  things  is  immediately  given 
through the extent of the reach that carries him to it, which 
comprises,  besides  the  arm’s  reach,  the  stick’s  range  of 
action (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 143). 
Such an interpretation of human-tool relations clearly resonates 
with this comment from Latour: ‘the very shape of humans, our 
very  body,  is  already  made  in  large  part  of  sociotechnical 
negotiations  and  artifacts’  (1994:  806).  In  a  similar  way, 
Haraway’s  postmodern  materialism  in  ‘A  Cyborg  Manifesto’ 
(1991) was deeply consonant with Bruno Latour’s actor-network 
theory,  and  also  offered  a  radical  understanding  of  agency  in 
technoculture.  For  Haraway,  ontology  is  relational,  with  an 
agency equally defined by materiality (biology, matter, ‘natural’ 
processes)  and  semiosis  (language,  meaning)  (Haraway  1991: 
208).  We  are  all  material-semiotic  actors  —  humans  and  non-
humans, organic and otherwise — hybrids of social or semiotic 
construction and materiality neither of which can fully account for 
nor be prioritised over the other. In this way, the boundaries and 
extendibility of our own bodies can be seen as a matter of social 
construction,  negotiation  with  tools  and  technologies,  and 
contingent  upon  the  material  environment.  In  other  words,  the 
construction of knowledge and social reality become cooperative 
effects achieved with other non-human partners, such that we are 
not the only actors in that production.  
 
Thus,  for  example,  we  are  accustomed  to  controlling  and 
interacting with information spaces primarily by way of screen-
interfaces, vision and hand-control, with a mouse, keyboard or a 
VR data-glove and headset, sometimes directing an avatar as the 
embodiment  or  vehicle  of  our  location,  movement  and  action 
within the virtual space. Here we have a sociotechnical network; a 
cluster  of  meanings  and  habits,  and  a  collective  of  combined 
agencies,  human  and  non-human  (indeed,  such  a  distinction 
barely  makes  sense  in  the  context  of  an  immersive  virtual 
environment).  Yet  the  default  hand-eye-device  interface  is  not 
‘fixed’  or  immutable;  it  can  effectively  be  challenged  and 
reorganized by alternative interfaces and meaning-making which 
deploy a different ratio of bodily perception and involvement, and 
a  different  ‘literacy’  of  the  virtual  space.  This  pliability  of  the 
corporeal schema in virtual environments is explored by a number 
of new media artists and installations, such as those created by 
Canadian VR installation artist Char Davies and her team  (see 
http://www.immersence.com). The priority given to the hand and 
eye  in  most  media  interfaces  —  through  the  use  of  screens, 
keyboards, mouse, remote controls or data gloves as orientation 
tools — has become so habitual as a way of controlling virtual 
environments, that we find it difficult to imagine otherwise. As 
Davies notes, in her environments the ‘hands-off interface’ (where 
the immersant must rely only on a head-mounted display, motion-
tracking  device  and  harness  to  monitor  breathing)  frees 
embodiment  from  the  ‘gravity-bound  modes  of  interaction  and 
navigation,’ and also from the desire to touch or ‘handle things’ 
(Davies 1998). Hence, to navigate through Davies’ simulations is 
to  appropriate  unfamiliar  devices  in  concord  with  non-habitual 
bodily movements and orientations, and to emplace one’s mode of 
‘having a body’ within an altered ‘collective’ of perceptual and 
material agencies. 
 
In  terms  of  multiplayer  gaming,  then,  we  can  imagine  how 
MMOGs and MMORPGs are very complex networks, vast body 
corporates in which actions, intentions, bodies, devices, material 
and  social  contingences  are  all  variably  and  dynamically 
intertwined.  Massively  multiplayer  online  games  are 
environments  in  which  thousands  of  users  are  simultaneously 
absorbed  into  a  game.  Connected  to  a  game  server  via  the 
Internet,  players  can  interact  in  real  time  with  other  users 
worldwide. Moreover, most MMOG’s can not be played as stand-
alone  or  single  player  games  and  can  only  be  played  online. 
Networks in this scenario could be seen in two ways. The most 
obvious is the Internet network made up of machines connected 
by the very material, world wide information systems. The second 
and  infinitely  more  complex  are  the  networks  made  of 
associations  between  heterogeneous  human  and  non  human 
entities that inhabit the collective. Such entities are as diverse as 
the  complex  interplay  between  the  rules  and  affordances  of  a 
game, the user’s offline context, and the online world created with 
other players and machines. All these networks together with their 
collective  actions  and  intentions  accrete a sense of history that 
will  eventually  structure  social, technical and material relations 
towards the development of a collective intelligence.  
 
Collective intelligence is very much a contested term, somewhat 
resonant with the term distributed cognition in human-computer 
interaction. At its most basic collective intelligence refers to the 
dynamics of collective problem solving. Namely, that problems 
may be solved with more efficiency as a co-operative collective 
rather than individuals. As seen in the simple gun/man collective 
of Figure 1, an agent has a problem, detours to another agent in 
order to fix the problem. Through their association a collective 
action is made possible that significantly influences both agents 
toward an action would have otherwise been impossible. In this 
way  the  artifact  has  become  a  part  of  the  humans  cognitive 
architecture  significantly  influencing  human  thought  (Clark, 
2003). 
 
But  the  success  or  failure  of  this  influential  relationship  is 
dependent on a number of agents in a network which shape or 
determine possible actions. Latour defines such mediated action 
as translation. Translation refers to the work that various agents 
do that modify, displace and translate various interests. That is to 
say that agents can expand their competencies by enrolling the 
interests  of  other  agents  into  their  networks  and  thereby 
mobilizing a collective force. This can be seen in the many ways 
players in MMOG’s like Ultima 2 allow “players” to personalize 
their  avatars  and  clan  paraphernalia,  weapons  or  environments 
made available to them via the affordance of computer software, 
gender  and  any  number  of  coercive  or  manipulative  agents.  
Indeed this behaviour has seen the definition of player not just as simultaneous  creator  but  essential  to  the  evolution  of  the 
collective that produces seemingly effortless play. 
 
In order for any network to remain stable various agents will need 
to negotiate and eventually agree to be defined and held in place 
by a system of influences. In this way agents are able to negotiate, 
compensate  for  other’s  weaknesses  and  work  together  towards 
establishing  a  solid  network  that  will  stabilise  relations.  These 
reified relations work together to make the world of MMOGs and 
MMORPGs  both  persistent  and  pervasive.  In  this  way  a  game 
world may depend on a complex network of events, agents, and 
practices;  from  the  computer  components  of  the  game  server 
based  in  London,  to  the  subscribers  and  their  embodiment  as 
‘players’  and  the  concomitant  social,  ergonomic,  and  visceral 
factors  involved,  to  the  persuasive  articles  written  in  game 
magazines, to the code that enables the game to run, to the players 
interacting  with  the  code,  to  the  virtual  artifacts  traded  and 
produced,  to  the  interaction  between  players,  to  the  evolving 
allegiances and political persuasions of online communities, and 
so on - the chain of agents is more or less endless. To trace the 
trajectory  of  this  trans-ontological  collective  from  its  mythical 
beginning to its unpredictable ends is no longer possible. This is 
because  in  multiplayer  online  games  the  greater  collective  that 
allows  and  produces  play  is  made  on  the  fly,  in  real time  and 
without limit; to have limits would see the end of the game, the 
end of stable relations and the end of persistent gameworlds.  
 
* 
 
In this paper we have suggested that it is useful to consider our 
experience  of  games  and  virtual  spaces,  and  the  human-
technology  relation  more  generally,  in  terms  of  actor-network 
theory and its relational ontology. The ‘agents’ that comprise any 
collective or network – whether it be a simple human-tool relation 
or  a  far  more  complex  assemblage  of  actors  in  massively 
multiplayer games – are equally human and non human, semiotic 
and material, corporeal and technical. This understanding aims to 
facilitate  a  more  nuanced,  non-humanist  and  anti-visualist 
understanding  of  gameplay  that  exceeds  the  more  conventional 
user-  and  viewer-centred  interpretations,  and  is  therefore  more 
organic to the open-ended and constantly changing nature of our 
engagement with online environments.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure 2 - Image adapted from Latour (1999: 179) 
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